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Corporate Law 
Does Trados Matter? 
 




In 2013, the Delaware Chancery Court issued an opinion that 
reverberated loudly in Silicon Valley. In the case of In re Trados 
Inc. Shareholder Litigation,2 the court scrutinized the action of a 
board of directors controlled by venture capital investors. 
Specifically, the court considered the board’s decision to sell 
Trados Incorporated for an amount that, in accordance with 
customary Silicon Valley stock terms, resulted in payouts to 
venture-capital (VC) funds holding preferred stock but no payouts 
to common shareholders. After a lengthy trial, the court ultimately 
found that the transaction was fair to the common shareholders 
because of the company’s limited prospects.3 Yet the case was 
notable for the court’s sharp critique of the board for failing to 
more vigilantly serve common shareholders.4 
The case inspired a wave of law-firm memos and client alerts 
speculating about effects on VC financing terms.5 Leading law 
firms, acting through the National Venture Capital Association, 
developed elaborate forms of contracts to circumvent the case’s 
effects.6 Legal scholars also took note of the case.7 In particular, 
 
1 Excerpted and adapted from Abraham J.B. Cable, Does Trados 
Matter?, 45 J. CORP. L. 311 (2020). 
2 73 A.3d 17 (Del. Ch. 2013). 
3 Id. at 78. 
4 Id. at 45. 
5 E.g., Venture Capital Investing: Can the Liquidation Preference of 
Preferred Stock Over the Common Stock Be Protected Where the 
Common Stock Receives Little or Nothing in an Exit?, LATHAM & 
WATKINS: CLIENT ALERT (Oct. 21, 2010). 
6 See NAT’L VENTURE CAPITAL ASS’N, NVCA MODEL VOTING 
AGREEMENT n.53 (2018). 
7 E.g., Robert P. Bartlett III, Shareholder Wealth Maximization as Means 
to an End, 38 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 255, 290–95 (2015) (criticizing the 
court’s reasoning for failing to recognize the board as a venue for 
bargaining over the company’s future); Elizabeth Pollman, Startup 
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they scrutinized language in the opinion adopting a rule of 
“common maximization.” Under this controversial approach to 
conflicts between common and preferred shareholders, a board 
has a paramount duty to pursue value for the common holders 
even when preferred holders have negotiated for control of the 
board.8 
But how much does Trados matter in influencing how boards 
and their advisors think and act? I examined the question through 
original interviews with 20 lawyers who guide startups and 
investors through financing and exit transactions. Because these 
transactional lawyers are a primary conduit of corporate law, 
Trados, in a practical sense, means what these lawyers think it 
means. Based on the interviews, I offer five primary observations. 
 
Venture Capital Deal Terms 
 
Trados has not meaningfully affected the terms of venture-
capital investments. Technically, contractual mechanisms can 
evade Trados. One mechanism is a “drag-along right” that allows 
one set of shareholders to cause other shareholders to agree to a 
merger or stock sale. Ordinarily, drag-along rights require board 
approval of the triggering transaction. But one could avoid 
entanglement with Trados by drafting a drag-along right that is 
triggered solely by the preferred shareholders, without any board 
 
Governance, 168 U. PA. L. REV. 155, 216–20 (2019) (discussing 
Trados). 
8 Trados, 73 A.3d at 40–41 (“[G]enerally it will be the duty of the board, 
where discretionary judgment is to be exercised, to prefer the interests of 
the common stock—as the good faith judgment of the board sees them 
to be—to the interests created by the special rights, preferences, etc. . . . 
of preferred stock.”). The primary conceptual alternative to common 
maximization is enterprise maximization. See William W. Bratton & 
Michael L. Wachter, A Theory of Preferred Stock, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 
1815, 1885–86 (2013) (advocating for a rule that directors should 
maximize aggregate enterprise value regardless of distributional 
consequences to different classes of stockholders). Another alternative is 
the “control-contingent” approach. See Jesse M. Fried & Mira Ganor, 
Agency Costs of Venture Capitalist Control in Startups, 81 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 967, 993 (2006) (advocating for a rule that would in some 
circumstances allow a director to favor a class of stock that has 
negotiated for board control). 
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involvement, in order to force a stock sale by common 
shareholders.  
My interviewees reported, however, that drag-along 
provisions are not usually modified in response to Trados because 
such provisions are impractical to enforce. One interviewee stated 
that most lawyers are “nervous about enforcement” of drag-along 
rights in general because shareholders can make procedural 
objections. Another suggested that any discussion of using drag-
along provisions in response to Trados was just “optics” and has 
not had any lasting effect. Yet another observed that it is “virtually 





Trados has modestly improved board process at the time a 
company is sold. Responding to one of the court’s chief criticisms 
of the Trados board,10 directors now more carefully document 
whether common stock has any probable value given the 
company’s chances of a turnaround. One interviewee reported that 
Trados gave rise to “a notion” that the board has to “take into 
account what benefits the common shareholders.” Another stated 
that Trados results in “focus on process” and “build[ing] a record” 
that the company “is running out of money” and “went out for 
deals.” This documentation focuses on qualitative indications of 
company distress rather than formal valuations by advisors.11 
 
Allocations to Common 
 
At the margins, Trados may motivate allocations to common 
shareholders beyond their baseline entitlements. When a board 
determines that common shares arguably have value, preferred 
holders may insure against litigation by shifting some proceeds to 
common shareholders.12 
 
9 Cable, supra note 1, at 327–29. 
10 Trados, 73 A.3d at 62 (stating that the board members “did not 
understand . . . their job” when they failed to specifically consider the 
effects of the sale on common holders). 
11 Cable, supra note 1, at 330–34. 
12 Id. at 334–35. 
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Corporate Law Ambiguities 
 
Many aspects of Trados remain ambiguous to the “startup 
lawyers” who are primarily responsible for counseling startups 
through financings and exits. For example, there is no clear 
consensus regarding the boundaries of Trados—i.e., what 
precisely in the Trados fact pattern triggered enhanced scrutiny. 
Interviewees also did not agree on the extent to which Trados 
endorsed a theory of common maximization, or whether such an 
approach to common-preferred conflicts is in fact correct as a 
matter of Delaware fiduciary principles. For example, several 
interviewees stated that a board owes duties to “all shareholders,” 
but this formulation does not precisely align with common 
maximization or any of its usual alternatives.13 
Some of this ambiguity may stem from the novelty and 
complexity of issues addressed by Trados. Corporate scholars 
have debated common maximization and its alternatives for years. 
It is also possible that startup lawyers have limited knowledge of 
Trados and other nuances of Delaware corporate law. While 
interviewees reported being familiar with the case, they also 
revealed that they do not consider themselves to be specialists in 
Delaware corporate law. They instead envision themselves as 
“general” corporate lawyers who call on specialists, such as M&A 




Due to resource constraints and a relatively mild litigation 
environment, startup boards may not be as responsive to judicial 
caselaw as their public-company counterparts. While public-
company boards may regularly use fairness opinions and 
independent committees to insulate transactions from judicial 
scrutiny, startup boards consider these trappings of public-
company governance to be disproportionately expensive or 
impractical. One interviewee, for example, described a 
“disconnect” between the amount of process required for a 
Delaware corporation and the amount available to most startups, 
and another stated that many sale transactions are not large enough 
 
13 Id. at 336–38.  
14 Id. at 340–41.  
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to justify “fund[ing]” a special committee.15 As the Delaware 
judiciary continues it dialogue with Silicon Valley startups, it 
should be aware that judicial influence can be muted in this 
environment. Such an awareness might ultimately affect doctrine, 
such as sharpening the boundaries of Trados and employing 
standards grounded in the practicalities of customary practice 
rather than comparisons to public-company governance. 
 
* * * 
 
Judges can benefit from knowing how responsive the business 
community is to judicial pronouncements. In the case of Trados, 




15 Id. at 339. 
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* * * 
 
